just another way
legitimizing power into authority

Anoush Khoshkish
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The repartee to the question “Is Democracy Working?” is “For whom?”[1] :1. For those who apply it as a model of government? Or, 2. For those who deal with democracies in the global context?

1. Different political cultures have used different methods and combinations to legitimize power into authority.  Broadly, those methods can be categorized into “consecration” and “constitutionalization.” Consecration can be “spiritual” such as the divine rights of kings, and/or “traditional” such as hereditary claims. “Constitutionalization” can be “contractual” and/or “representational.”  The English Magna Carta was mainly contractual. Many modern polities are  “representational.”  Democracy is a variation on these themes, ranging from town square deliberations to representative government.  It works when it reflects the consent of the governed; but can also be used by dominant tribes, classes or faiths for control.

2. In the global context, the question as to whether democracy is working mainly concerns freedom of people, not only under the law, but also for free economic, scientific and cultural intercourse. It is assumed that democracies are more likely to create conditions for free trade, respect for international conventions such as copyright and free flow of capital and labor. But a freely elected government, invoking national interests, may nationalize its economy, control foreign exchange and impose tariffs.

Beyond democracy, globalization should and does accommodate intercourse among regimes that use different processes to legitimize power into authority. Instead of attempts at injecting democracy into environments not attuned to it, the global community would be better off by prodding different actors to harmonize their global functional interests and cultural values, and by holding them responsible for their acts. Another important area of focus for the global community should be to sensitize global finance to its global political responsibilities. 

I.Democracy as a Legitimizing Process

Democracy is a catchall terminology. Briefly, it covers the historic Pnyx[2] facing the Parthenon in Athens, and the Panchayat of Indian villages, to the more recent defunct German Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of North Korea, and the multitude of variations in between. Democracy can probably be best defined by its negation: it is not wise to be “undemocratic”![3]

In order to wrap our arms around the definition of democracy in the library, we need to review the thoughts of the multitude between Adams and Zeno.The list of thinkers and writers who have touched on the subject will itself constitute a volume. Yet, to answer the question as to whether “democracy is working?” we need to define the subject. To attenuate the dilemma, I propose to circumscribe the treatment of democracy to its characteristics as one of the venues for legitimizing power into authority.Even then, I will need to telegraphically cover certain essential aspects of democracy for a minimum coherence of the discourse and, in doing so, refer the reader to some of my earlier, more extensive treatments of the subject.

Schematically, I recognize two main strains in the processes for the conversion of power into authority: those of consecration and constitutionalization.[4]

In consecration factors beyond  the rulers and the ruled are evoked to legitimize power into authority, which I identify as spiritual and traditional. The spiritual bestows authority to the powerful through faith: the divine rights of king. In the traditional, the authority of the powerful derives from immutable temporal patterns established in the past. The two processes intertwine and complement each other – the Chinese dynasties were hereditary, but they ruled by the mandate of heaven, and every now and then, heaven withdrew its mandate and passed it on to a new conqueror/emperor. 

By constitutionalization I refer to the processes of legitimization of power into authority that mainly develop on the basis of factors within and among the components of the power complex, with little or no intervention by, or resort to, factors beyond – in particular, the supernatural. I recognize two main dimensions in constitutionalization: the contractual and the representational. By contractual I do not necessarily imply an incipient social contract in the Lockean or Rousseauan sense, but rather, an understanding between the ruler and the ruled on the modalities of the exercise of authority by the ruler, without necessarily the active participation or representation of the ruled. The evolution of the British polity from the Magna Carta of 1215, through the Parliament’s “Great Protestation” of 1621[5], to the Convention Parliament of 1689 [6] is an illustration of the passage from the contractual to the representational dimension. The crux of the representational is the emergence of “the people” as the factors within. The representational process assumes the participation of the ruled in the legitimization of the power of the rulers into authority.

Democracy – government by the masses – is, in modern parlance, a misnomer for the representational process and it is in that sense that it should be understood.[7] It does not evoke the Athenian Pnyx or the Rousseauan town square meeting where the people deliberate and the majority legitimizes the leaders to execute the outcomes of the deliberations. Democracy refers to representational forms of government, whether republics or constitutional monarchies, that have evolved since the Middle Ages in the West. It has taken them centuries to do so and they still carry within them the vestiges of their earlier spiritual, traditional and contractual characteristics.[8]

Democracies are not exactly “government by the people.” Structurally, they have had, and have, limitations on participation in the political process ranging from age, race, sex, wealth, and property to class and education. It is estimated that of a United States population of about 4 million less than 160,000 voted for delegates to all the ratifying conventions which ordained and established the Constitution in 1787.[9] Successive enfranchisements in different Western democracies over the past couple of centuries have reduced voting restrictions and broadened the base of the electorate. But as we shall see later, there are other parameters that condition “government by the people.”

Democracy’s Public Service Responsibilities

That in democracy the ruled are expected to be the source of the rules, and that the rulers are expected to be answerable to the ruled, requires three sets of conditions: 1. The capacity of the ruled to participate,  2. The obligation of the rulers to make that participation possible and, 3. The existence of structures which make the rulers answerable to the ruled.

1. In order to be effectively instrumental in shaping their polity, “the people” should be well informed and enjoy – and be disposed to use – their freedom of thought, expression, assembly and association. That does imply access of the masses to a certain degree of education, notably for their awareness about the characteristics of a civil society. It would be difficult to envisage a democratic polity if the basic education provided by schools aimed mainly at making the population functional for the market economy (the three R’s), or were faith-based as in Islamic Madressas. The electorate should be able and willing to debate, deliberate and compromise, and be disposed to accept the electoral equality of one man (woman), one vote, pluralism, and the principles of majority rule and minority rights.

2. The authorities put in place by the will of the people should create the mechanisms which permit the people to fully and freely exercise that will through participation in the political process, fair elections and smooth transition and installation of powers.

Despite the voluminous literature devoted to the umbilical cord which is assumed to connect private enterprise and liberal economy to democracy, the fact is that, of the different processes of legitimization of power into authority, democracy is the one which, by its very nature, is expected to provide certain public services in order to enable people to exercise their democratic rights and participate in the political process. Access to information, freedoms of expression, assembly and association will remain dead letters in a pure market economy, where free enterprise does not provide the means for their exercise because the remoteness, sparseness or poverty of some segments of population makes them not profitable markets. In a democracy, the authorities should secure, as public service, means of communication, free flow of information, and transportation, not only for economic development and the exercise of their own authority, but to enable all of their constituents to exercise their democratic rights.

3. In terms of control structures, different processes of legitimization of power into authority develop different forms of checks and balances such as church and state in spiritual consecration, the collusion and hierarchy of different clans and tribes in the traditional process, or aristocracy checking monarchy in contractual arrangements. In democracy, it is the people that the authorities are accountable to and checks and balances should emanate from the people through such methods as local, state and federal levels of control and/or separation of the different branches of government – legislative, executive and judiciary.

What I have listed above is a thumbnail presentation of the essentials for an ideal democracy. These are principles that, like all other principles applied to human realities, are, in the long run, prone to aberration. Are there points along their evolution where the degree of their aberration would make democracies cease to work as such? To answer that question, we will need to make a brief excursion into democracy’s potentials for aberration.

The “Weightier Parts”

The fact remains that by the very nature of the pyramid of power, whether in democracy or in any other polity, it is the “weightier part” of “the people” that controls the levers of power. Democracy, by its pluralist attributes, is more likely to provide fertile grounds for the emergence of multiple pyramids of power among the weightier parts of the polity and thus satisfy a bigger number of ambitions. In their conflicts, competition, bargaining, compromise, cooperation, and combinations, the multitude of power pyramids, both public and private, create checks and balances which would benefit “the people” at large.[10] I am using the term “weightier part” in order not to get entangled in the loaded discourse on “elitism.” [11]

Elitism implies propulsive dynamics – as if elitism as a process in itself propelled elites into positions of power. It also implies, as a term, a certain degree of meritocracy and sophistication, which is not always the way of the weightier parts. The term “weightier part” carries within it socio-political, as well as economic and cultural factors which cause the weight to shift from some parts of the socio-political complex to others – without, necessarily bestowing on them the “elite” qualification which has a superior quality attribute. It was Reformation, Calvinism and Protestant Ethics that shifted the weight from aristocracy to bourgeoisie.[12] It was the industrial revolution that eventually shifted the weight of the bourgeoisie to the “barons of industry.” It was the Cold War that gave preeminence to the military-industrial complex, whose contribution to the conclusion of the Cold War gave rise to the global spread of market economy and global financial networks. It was that initial élan of market economy and financial networks, convoluted with the “electronic revolution” and technological advances, that shifted the emphasis from production to consumption, transferring the weight of power from the barons of industry to investment bankers, hedge-funds and promoters and controllers of brands. Today, productive industries compete globally to supply the moguls of consumerism whose margins of profit far exceed those of actual producers.[13]

Parallel to these evolutions in Western cultures, the exploitive characteristics of free enterprise incited religious institutions to develop and encourage charitable associations to engage in social problems; instigated workers to form trade unions; and inspired those with social ambitions who were not part of the establishment, and were critical of the course of events, to set up non-governmental organizations as their own pyramids of power.[14] These pyramids of power intersect with economic and financial networks and lobbies, pressuring and influencing political parties and institutions of government. Of course, weight shifts have not been uniform in different Western democracies.[15]

Looking at this sketch, one could assume that democracy – like other forms of government – obviously works for the weightier parts of the society.

The Consuming Masses

As cultural, political, and socio-economic weights shift, those in control of power pyramids contribute to the momentum of the shifts, at times in ways that move the weight away from them. History is fraught with examples. Pertinent to our discourse here is the case of some of the barons of industry who, in the hay days of the industrial revolution, used their weight as a lever to uplift the “people” by building libraries, opera houses, schools and universities – both to redeem themselves and to prepare the grounds for educational and scientific advances that could contribute to the development of their industries. Scientific advances outpaced industrial revolution and launched the post-industrial era in the West with its concomitant ideology of consumerism.

Today, rather than patronizing the people to learn, consumerism addresses and excites their cravings and appetite, and entertains them. In a sense, today’s democracy in the West, particularly in the United States, is closer than ever to the “will of the people.” The media, seeking to capture ever-larger audiences in order to attract more advertising, indulge in sensationalism and express what the masses want to hear and see, catering to the lowest common denominator.

On the face of it, then, democracy also works for the people. They are broadly content (measured by consumer confidence charts), as they are provided with abundant bread (fast food), circus (sex and violence), credit facilities to borrow, and the opportunity to “exercise their freedom” to choose from an overwhelming variety of goods.

The general public’s avidity for the sensational has shortened their span of attention and has increased their indifference to complex political debate. For the political process, the weightier parts sway the electorate with spins, and smoke and mirrors. Political candidates are, above all, expected to entertain and clown their way into office rather than present coherent programs – an atmosphere which discourages thoughtful but reserved candidates to jump into the fray. But even the sensational candidates repertory pales in comparison with the excitements created by the entertainment industry. The phenomenon explains public apathy and low turnouts in elections. It can also reflect the public perception that there is little difference between those who run for office.[16]

In reviewing the contemporary developments in Western democratic polities I have made assumptions to the effect that on the face of it, democracy seems to be working for both the weightier parts of the society and the masses. The question, however, is whether it is democracy that is working or whether it is consumerism that is confused with democracy, compensating for public involvement and active participation in the democratic process! 

To answer that question we need to test our brief excursion into the evolution of democracy against the depth of a polity’s understanding of, and commitment to, its principles. But what are the criteria for deciding whether democracy is working? Are there factors for evaluation? Here I propose to look at some of the parameters which could constitute bases for the appreciation of a democratic polity: 

  • The depth of commitment to the spirit, the ideology, and the process of democracy in a culture;
  • The place and role of the individual members of the society in a democracy;
  • The balance between the exercise of democratic rights and authoritative control; and, 
  • The efficacy of democracy to address the common good and provide the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

The Spirit, the Ideology, and the Process

Whatever its method of legitimization of power into authority, a system works when the rulers and the ruled believe in the principles underlying the legitimacy of their authority structure. Monarchy, for example, works when the people believe that their sovereign is anointed by the grace of God, and their king also is God-fearing and believes that he is accountable to God in the treatment of his people and the administration of justice. When the rulers do not believe in the spirit of their system of government and use its myth and process to rob and abuse their people, the system rots. Democracy would lose its spirit if, as Ricker put it, “free society” is confused with “a free market by which … the rich are free to fleece the poor.” [17]

Democracies present different degrees, shades and hues of democratic spirit, ideology and process. Categorizing those shades and hues will, per force, be subjective. But it would be fair to assume, for example, that the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, because of their historic evolution, have had polities imbued with a good degree of democratic spirit – Iceland’s Althing of 930 a.d. is often cited as the first “democratic parliament.”[18] Or, one could argue that American democracy, as the precursor of modern democracies, has the zeal of an ideology and is driven by a good dose of mythology and faith in being “God’s Country” – always landing on its feet in crises – and the “American Dream” of individual freedom and equality of opportunity.[19]

As for the democratic process, in the absence of the spirit, or at least a well-encrusted ideology, it can become a travesty. The implantation of democratic process in non-Western cultures could dislodge cultural communal patterns of legitimization of power into authority and shift the weight to new sectors of power which, not committed to the spirit of democracy, may, and most often do, use their authority to exploit those they govern for the benefit of their own clique and clan. Hence endemic corruption. 

In periods of prolonged apathy or moments of crisis, the democratic process can go awry even in more attuned polities, and obscure the spirit of democracy, perverting it to the point of no return. Remember that by his astute use of propaganda and exploitation of mass appeal, Hitler gained office through the democratic process. With the “clash of cultures” that we are witnessing today, we have to be alert to the danger of the masses falling for political tendencies which could curtail the democratic process.

Individualism and Democracy

Democracy implies elections, individual vote and personal choice.These fundamental elements touch on the very basic ratio of communal identity and the individual’s consciousness as an independent agent. The adaptability of a political culture to democracy will depend on that ratio. The sense of identity, of belonging to a family, a clan, a group, a tribe, a caste, an ethnicity, a religion, a culture, or a nation, is a human reality and can become an individual’s quasi-total consciousness. Broadly speaking, in the West before Renaissance – just as in many non-Western cultures today – the sense of belonging and community overshadowed that of the self and the individual as an integral unit. 

The literature on modern individualism in every field, whether psychology, economics, politics, economics etc. is vast. But an incursion into its ur-concept could shed light on the point I would like to make about its role as the basic ingredient of democratic spirit. In order to examine the different dimensions of "individualism" I first need to make a distinction between the “individual” and the “person.”

Individuum – the Latin source for the word “individual” means that which, if further divided, loses the characteristics of its whole. Once we have divided and subdivided human society to smaller and smaller groups and categories, we reach, in the Western concept of human society, to the last indivisible unit of the society: the individual. I qualify “Western” because, indeed, in other cultures the criterion may not apply. For example, in Islamic culture, the integrity of human body can be violated when the hand of a thief is severed.

Per sonus – “by its sound” in Latin, is at the origin of the word “person.” It is the way by which an individual goes beyond the confines of individuality and impresses other individuals by communicating with them. It is that dimension of the individual that, by making personal choices, affects the course of the collectivity.[20] Personality is the subtle factor within the individual which distinguishes participation in public deliberations between doing as others do, or acting according to a personal point of view. 

“Individualism” is often confused with personality. Personality expands, encroaches and impresses other individuals within its reach. That is what, for example, political activists do. Individualism is different in that it is the individual’s affirmation of his individuality in the sense of his rights to privacy and freedom of inner thoughts and imagination – which may indeed, at times, go against the prevalent legal, ethical or moral standards.[21] In democracy, "individualism's" independence should be complemented by the individual’s awareness of the fact that his freedom stops at the freedom of others. 

In essence, these are variations on the broader universal concepts of ego and alter ego, self and the whole, self-in-itself  and self-in-the-world. Here we have focused on their particular aspects which, in the context of Western cultures, have become social bases for the democratic process. They lay at the social base of individuals’ claim to respect for the minority of one, one man (woman) one vote, privacy, or freedom of thought; and persons’ demand for freedom of expression, communication and assembly. 

The corollary for their effectiveness is the existence of an educated population free from dogma, imbued with the spirit of democracy and respect of civil rights, and conscious about the need for the basic instruments that make the exercise of democratic rights possible and the mechanisms that create favorable environment for equal opportunity and reasonable and dynamic distribution of resources. This is a tall order, even for the most pretentious of Western democracies.

Above all, an educated and well-informed population should maintain effective checks and balances to make separation of powers meaningful and be alert to the inherent tendencies of "authority" to dull the "democratic" factors – as shown below. 

Democratic Rights vs Authoritarian Control

Compared with other processes for legitimizing power into authority, the paradox of democracy is that, to qualify as such, it requires factors that contrast with those of authority:
Periodicity in office
Continuity in Office
Conformity – uniformity
Loyalty to chain of command
Open access to participation in politics
Opacity and secrecy
Selective access based on  position

The authority that has been anointed by the grace of God, or chiseled in the mists of time by tradition, does not have to render account to “the people.” Even in contractual processes of legitimization of power into authority, many of the factors listed under democracy may not apply. In democracy there is a constant tug of war between the democratic process and the authority it has legitimized. Invariably, the platform of new candidates in the United States is to invest Washington and fix it!

Democracy, as a method of legitimization of power into authority, has great propensity for the aberration of its own basic principles. A classic case of aberration of basic principles was the unfortunate democratic experience in the Soviet Union. The democratic centralism long debated and eventually embraced by communists and defined by Lenin as "freedom to criticize, but unity in action" became that of Stalin’s dictatorship, Nomenklatura and Breznev’s opulent bureaucratic sclerosis that led to the fall of the regime.

Given the generic incompatibility of democracy and authority, in our age of electronic consumerism with its potentials for total control of information and communication, where the weightier part, not imbued with the spirit of democracy, embraces a particular agenda and manages to control all the levels and branches of government, democratic process can be jeopardized. The weightier part need not be a declared social monolith but the overlapping area of powers seeking control adhering to a particular Weltanschauung. By intimidation, penetration and sabotage of their detractors or by prodding them into collusion, the weightier part can bring an array of power seekers within its fold and control the masses through its different variations. 

The advanced techniques of control and surveillance used by the authorities will not only paralyze the democratic process and intrude on individual freedoms, but also warp the very dynamics of shifts among the weightier parts. In the United States, for example, the tenets of democracy have been that of the least interference by the government in the world of free enterprise – the role of government is assumed to be that of providing security and law and order, leaving enterprise free to compete on a level field. But where the authorities, in the name of security, can eavesdrop on all communications, entrepreneurial ingenuity and developing competitive ideas in privacy become meaningless. Business laws punish insider trading. But the eavesdropping government bureaucracy becomes an insider that can be accessed by those economic powers that have gained political control.[22]

Common Good & Greatest Happiness for the Greatest Number

What is ironic about the application of the criteria of the common good and greatest happiness for the greatest number in the context of the electronic age consumerism and attention deficient democracy is that the democratic process could be perverted to produce a curious amalgam of 1984 cum Fahrenheit 451

I am, of course, referring to two futuristic novels which have marked Western political consciousness ever since their publication over half a century ago, namely: George Orwell’s 1984 (1949), which is the story of a polity where the ruling party of the “Big Brother” fabricates “the truth,” brainwashes the people and, keeping them in constant fear of aggressors, increases its military power and announces victory; and, Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 (1953), which is the story of a clandestine group of people hiding in the country side – the “walking camp” – who have memorized books for posterity in a regime that burns books.

The 1984 cum Fahrenheit 451 scenario begins by a perversion of the democratic goals of providing the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and the common good. For most people in the age of electronic consumerism happiness is not abstract civil rights but access to the sources of their needs and desires, and freedom from making critical choices and taking hard decisions. Through modern techniques of information control and public opinion manipulation (with a good dose of fear about security, and assurances that those in power are best placed to provide protection) the masses can be conditioned to believe that they are living in the best of all possible worlds. The fear factor is also that of retribution, persecution and prosecution by the Big Brother who, with intrusive surveillance of private and public lives, knows of the skeletons hidden in the closets. Freedom of expression would be mainly claimed by those aiming at creating demand for the wares they want to sell. People's exercise of freedom and taking hard decisions become choosing between plaid and polka dots.[23]

In this 1984 cum Fahrenheit 451 setting the Big Brother does not altogether suppress opponents. Those who criticize authority are not hiding but free to roam in ineffective circles of Fahrenheit 451 “Walking Camps”. Dissidence and even some disobedience are tolerated as, at times, amusing, annoying, irritating and irrelevant distractions. The avidity of the public for "new" news and the shortness of its memory, especially to retain negative and unpleasant information, permit the Big Brother to bury its failures. Of course, if deviations from the course chosen by the ruling power become threatening, with the electronic and coercive means of control at its disposal, the authority can intimidate, blackmail, neutralize or ultimately crush the recalcitrant. 

The vulnerability of democracy to the 1984 cum Fahrenheit 451 scenario has become more ominous since 9/11. Today, Londoners go about being observed by CCTV (close circuit television cameras) – on the average 300 times a day. Some of them are oblivious to the fact, some are incensed by the intrusion in their privacy, and others acquiesce but are upset about the bureaucratic inefficacy of the surveillance – as otherwise the bus and tube bombing terrorists of July 7, 2005 would not have succeeded. We now know – as a result of testimonies in the Moussaoui case – that a less bureaucratic FBI may have been able to avert 9/11.[24]

At best, particularly since 9/11 and the effervescence of clash of cultures, democracy in the West is limping.The jury is out. Whether democracy will work and in what form in the electronic age will need to be examined in a generation from now. Will there be “walking camps” left, or will all be loving the “Big Brother”!? The chances for the “walking camps” to break out of their invisible shell and awaken the masses to their consumerist addiction and fear syndrome do not look good at present. That will need a massive turnaround of the course of education, media and entertainment – hard to accomplish on short notice. In this clash of cultures, the awakening of the masses to the shallowness of consumerist ideology may come, not through Western rational and intellectual tradition, but through self-righteous religious fundamentalism. Looking at the demographics, it may well be Islam![25]

The most probable last utterances of “Allah Akbar” by the terrorist assassins ramming the jet-liners into the World Trade Center Twin Towers in New York City on September 11, 2001 traced and opened the chasm of the clash of cultures for all to see and feel. A state of war on terrorism has been declared but there is no front. The war is between democratic values and religious fundamentalism. But the Western combatants, particularly Americans, are ill equipped to fight that war. The war is between a culture of “In God We Trust” that has neglected its civic and secular education and those who trust in God even more – the terrorists.[26]

It is in this potentially precarious state that the West, and its standard bearer, the United States, are on a rampage to globalize democracy. [27]

II. Globalization and Democracy

Is Democracy Exportable and/or Imposable?

The American aspiration to actually convert the rest of the world to democracy is relatively recent. In his farewell address, Washington advised America to do business with other powers but stay clear of their politics. It inspired the “Open Door” policy which has remained the bedrock of United States foreign relations. In the nineteenth century, American ideals of democracy and freedom seeped into other cultures inadvertently through religious missionaries and were often misunderstood.[28] Even by the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States’ goal was not that of installing democratic regimes in other countries, as witnessed by the suppression of Emilio Aguinaldo’s movement in the Philippines (1899-1902.) The idea of spreading democracy – selectively – was proposed at the League of Nations by Woodrow Wilson and he was chastised for doing so by his fellow Americans in the Congress.

As for the European democracies, democratizing the non-Western world was not the goal of their colonial aspirations. In their attempts to make the territories they controlled manageable, the colonial powers favored structures not always amenable to democratic spirit. For example, in India the British retained the Zamindari (landlord system) to the detriment of Panchayat (community councils.) Or, while the “indirect rule” of the British Crown Colony System in West Africa did transfer authority to some local communities, its main goal was to relieve the burden of colonial administration – and also keep the local political characteristics, as distinct from “British.”[29] Retrospectively, one could argue that some of the Western policies sowed the seeds of the present clash of cultures.[30]

Even the Mandate system of the League of Nations embodied the condescending spirit of the “white man’s burden.” According to Article 22 of the Covenant"… the tutelage of such peoples – not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world – should be entrusted to advanced nations.” That article also incorporated the American concern for “open door” by requiring the Mandatory powers to “secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League."The tutelage did not require the mandatory power to install democratic regimes in the mandate territories. Indeed, when in 1921 the British proceeded to turn over their short- lived mandate in Iraq, they resorted to the traditional process of legitimization and created a monarchy.

The United Nations does not particularly emphasize democracy as a method of legitimizing power into authority for self-government either – the term democracy does not appear in the U. N. Charter. Rather, the basic objectives of the Trusteeship system were: … “to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned” (Article 76) – emphasis is mine.

It was only when the emergence of “Peoples’ Liberation Fronts” and the specter of “Peoples Democratic Republics” cropping up and siding with the Soviet communist block became haunting that the West toyed with the idea of promoting its own brand of freedom and electoral processes. And in a few cases its application backfired viz. the election of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1950 or Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile in 1970 – which were promptly dispatched! 

We need not dwell long here on the mostly dysfunctional "democracies" that were installed in former colonial territories as sovereign states – without the "nation-state" characteristics that had evolved into Western democracies. As noted earlier, in many new "sovereign states" the legitimization of the power of a particular clan, tribe or cabal into authority through democratic travesty gave rise to massive abuse of power and corruption.[31]

During the Cold War the concern of Western powers was not so much to spread democracy, as it was to make sure that the “Third World” countries did not end up in the “Second World”: Korean War, Vietnam War, Shah vs. Mossaddegh, Suharto vs. Sukarno, The Colonels vs. monarchy in Greece, Mobutu vs. Lumumba, just to mention a few.

A note should be entered here about the effect of the Helsinki Accords of 1975 on the spread of democratic ideas in the Soviet block. There was a deliberate intention on the part of Western signatories of the Accord to make the Soviets acquiesce to a freer flow of ideas and greater respect for human rights in exchange for the Western powers' recognition of WW II Soviet territorial acquisitions. In the long run, the Soviets’ application of the accord created conditions in the Soviet block which – granted, in combination with other factors – were not insignificant in the final democratic outcomes in Eastern Europe. It notably nudged Gorbachev into Glasnost and Perestroika.[32]

The debate on the spread of democracy gained vigor after the collapse of the Soviet block.[33] The end of the Cold War was not so much that of the triumph of democracy over totalitarian and authoritarian regimes as it was of that of capitalism over communism. Market economy became the order of the day. 

At the end of the Cold War the military-industrial complex, as the weightier part in the United States, together with the labor lobbies worrying about layoffs, did not let America divert its peace dividend to spread democracy. In 1987 the Soviet Union had 46% of the global arms market share, compared to 16% for the U.S. and 9% for Britain. By 1994 the proportions had reversed, with the U. S. having 46.5%, Britain 21% and Russia 8% of the global arms market share. The recipients of U. S. arms were not democratic regimes. They were oil rich potentates whose petro-dollars were thus siphoned back into the American economy.[34] Many regimes have used their arms to suppress internal dissents. And in many newborn “nation-states,” the availability of arms on the international market has enticed competing clans to jockey for power to grab “national” riches and engage in brutal conflicts, notably in Africa. 

For the United States, the logic of global financial imperialism was that of securing America’s primacy as the lone superpower in terms of military prowess – to be able to globally defend and maintain American interests –and penetrate and control other economies through movement of capital and investments. That post-industrial logic, in effect, transferred industrial productive capacities to non-Western economies. That transfer eventually resulted in the present day global wealth, trade and economic imbalances whose impact, while crucial, go beyond the scope of this report, but should be kept in mind. It is from that perspective that the ideals of “freedom” and “democracy” promoted as recipes for change in the non-Western world make more sense.

By shifting the focus on the spread of market economy rather than democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union we can better understand the fact that presently authoritarian regimes such as those of presidents Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan or Aliyev of Azerbaijan entertain good relations with Western democracies and corporations. Considering the present reign of consumerism ideology and financial imperialism alluded to earlier, the freedom that is prescribed is inspired by the traditional American “open door” policy. The freedom that is sought is for free enterprise and free movement of capital in global markets. As for democracy, not all electoral results are appreciated. Chavez in Venezuela, or Morales in Bolivia may have been elected as presidents of their country fair and square, but they are treated as pariahs by Western democracies. Speaking of which, most of the present freely elected presidents in Latin America are not the ones the “free world,” i.e., the free market economy, would have preferred.

The present Western double standards do not particularly qualify us as honest brokers for selling democracy to other cultures. That brings us to our next question:

Does Democracy Work in Global Human Dynamics?

It all depends:

For whom? For the actor, or, for the other actors dealing with a democracy; and, 

From what perspective? In terms of global capitalism, or, in terms of respect for international law, contribution to the maintenance of peace and order, and fulfillment of international obligations, including environmental protection, respect for human rights and free flow of information? These are intertwined dimensions that cannot be easily disentangled. As we treat them from different angles we need to keep them in mind as a whole flux. 

Is democracy good for the actor in its dealings with other actors? 

To answer that question we should have in mind our earlier discussion of the weightier parts and the masses.It all depends on an actor’s political culture: who the “weightier parts” within the actor are, how much sway they have and what their perspectives are. There are motivations such as security, pride, protection of national industry and natural resources, maintaining and improving standards of living, job creation etc., that have much more to do with the cohesion of the weightier parts and the people than the process of legitimization of power into authority. A paternalistic aristocratic empire may, in dealing with other actors, serve the general interests of its people better than a democracy in which those elected to office represent a weightier class that has financed their campaigns and lobbies them, in their dealings with other global actors, to facilitate the expansion and transfer of their productive capital abroad, thus handicapping the distribution of wealth and the improvement of the standards of living within the country. 

Looking at the phenomenon from another angle, we may find that in a democracy where the masses are not well versed in world affairs and their representatives need to appeal to their sense of security in order to get reelected, the legislators may hamper what the executive branch has negotiated or has committed itself to accomplish at the global level, as was, for example, the case of the recent Congressional objection to Dubai’s acquisition of P&O port control in the United States. Democratic checks and balances within the polity can thus slow, paralyze or reverse the course of its dealings with other actors. It is a recurrent aspect of the United States dealings on the international scene. Its glaring historical example was, of course, that of Woodrow Wilson’s failure to join the League of Nations, mentioned earlier.

The discrepancy between “the will of the people” advanced by elected representatives and the “international obligations” of the state negotiated by the executive authority can become, at times, hard to reconcile. A party elected on a platform negating the standing international obligations of the state may find it difficult to implement its platform once in office – or implement it and lose credibility on the international scene. Contemporary cases in point being the US renouncement of the Kyoto agreement, or Palestine Hamas government’s platform of non-recognition of Israel; which brings us to our next question.

Is democracy a better interlocutor for the other actors? 

Here we look at the same ingredients covered by the preceding question from a different angle – from the outside. It all depends who the other actors are, what they are after, and to what extent their design is palatable to and compatible with the actor’s disposition.

Take, for example, the abundant literature and data on the assumption that there is less likelihood for democracies to go to war against each other. Democracy, after all, is only about a couple of centuries old and as we have seen, has many variations. It all depends who considers whom a democracy and a worthy interlocutor. The belligerent governments of Israel and Hamas in Palestine, mentioned earlier, are both democratically elected. George W. Bush recently reflected that he was not necessarily going to negotiate with Hamas in Palestine, Evo Morales in Bolivia, or Hugo Chavez in Venezuela just because they were democratically elected. Having in mind variations in the qualification of democracies as to whether they reflect its spirit, its myth or its process, and their variable weightier parts, it would be more realistic to admit that besides outright violence and war, there can exist wide potential conflictual areas among different democratic actors.

As noted earlier, the internal cohesion of actors, and their motivations and aspirations, are more important and pertinent to their global relations than the processes by which they legitimize power into authority. At times, it may be easier to conclude a pact with a well-encrusted authoritarian regime, and have it honored, than with an unstable populist democracy – as long as the authoritarian regime has the tradition and reputation of respecting its international obligations and is in place through processes of legitimization of power into authority broadly coherent for both the rulers and the ruled. 

* * *

As we plunge into the flux, we realize that, in so far as global human dynamics are concerned, it is not the process by which power within an actor has been legitimized into authority that qualifies it as efficient and credible.The “functional interests” of other actors in the global arena are met when the actor is predictable, stable, accountable, assumes its responsibilities, respects its commitments and delivers what it has negotiated.[35]On that score, Saudi Arabia, which is not a democracy, has extensive relations with foreign oil companies and satisfies the functional interests of countries that depend on its oil.It is, however, highly predictable that deviation from Islamic codes by oil company employees in public in that country could have dire consequences. Here, we are touching on a very different aspect of relationship between the actors on the global scene.

On the one hand, there are the qualifications enumerated above for an actor’s reliability as interlocutor that we could call functional interests. On the other hand there are criteria that we could identify as cultural values that reflect the depth, breadth, variety and intensity of relations between actors.They have to do with the compatibility of the actors’ prevailing value systems.They decide to what extent and under what conditions intercourse between the actors is possible. For example, speaking of the coherence of functional interests and cultural values, the European Union has removed many barriers between its members and there is now a good degree of intercourse among European peoples, their affairs and their cultural values. The flow among the members of EU is, however, quite different from the undercurrent which exists, with more or less intensity, within the Islamic world from the Philippine islands and Sinkiang region in China, to Nigeria and Morocco in Africa. That flow is that of cultural values -- in this case, the Moslem faith -- and in many ways it can impede global functional interests. 

III. Why Did You Ask?

Reviewing what we have covered, we can now better understand why the question as to whether democracy is working has been chosen as the theme of this meeting.

Humanity is presently at a critically volatile crossroad and some believe that the solution to the crisis is the promotion and imposition of “democracy” worldwide. I mentioned earlier the Helsinki Accord’s partial effect in spreading democracy in the Soviet Block.That Accord was negotiated in a secular context by actors all claiming some form of democracy, and the challenge was between capitalist and socialist economic regimes, i.e., competing methods of social organization, each with its own rationale. Promoting democracy may not be the cure for our present global ailment as the Helsinki Accord was for the Cold War. The present irresistible force facing insurmountable obstacle is not liberal democracy versus ideological totalitarianism, as was the case during the Cold War, but global consumerism ideology versus religious righteousness. If there were truly free elections today in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan, chances are that radical Moslem parties would come to power. Introduction of true democracy in the Gulf states would most probably reduce their consumerism allure, oblige them to treat their imported labor more humanely, and ignite sectarian conflicts. Belief and ideology are at opposite poles of the value spectrum.[36] Injecting democracy into their confrontations to appease them can become counterproductive.

Present Realities

Instead of beating the drum of democracy, we could work with what we actually have and, while adjusting to present realities, where possible, adjust them. And there are a lot of adjustments to be made. As I have elaborated elsewhere, there are a number of pernicious patterns on the global scene that we have to deal with such as corruption, terror, conspiracy, privatized security/public scrutiny and hypocrisy.[37]

While actors will have their own processes to legitimize power into authority, their standing on the global scene should, and to a large extent does, reflect the nature and extent of their relations with other actors. As noted, those relations will have different amalgams of overlapping functional interests and cultural values. Besides the characteristics enumerated earlier establishing the reliability of the actor (predictability, stability, accountability, assumption of responsibility, respect for commitments and delivering what the actor has negotiated) codes of conduct, so to speak, have emerged, superseding sovereignty and the exclusive jurisdiction of states.There is a large consensus in the global community today on certain notional principles of human rights, including action against terrorism; genocide or ethnic cleansing, that one could relate to the ideals of democracy. Where the observance of functional interests fail, and certain exercises prescribed by certain cultural values (such as Jihad) become threatening to global peace, the global community can take upon itself to intervene. And in some cases it does intervene.The present dilemma is that the parameters of such interventions are not well defined and are subject to particular functional interests and cultural values of certain actors and not others. The world sat and watched the massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, but intervened in Kosovo.

There appeared a short period after 9/11 when the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, harboring the terrorists, became a matter of large global consensus. Regime change, nation-building and attempt to implant democracy in that country became a necessity, and under the circumstances was justifiable. Our brief review of the history of the transfer of Western political values into non-Western cultures, however, demonstrated that it is not necessarily the Western models that could or should be systematically applied. The invasion of Iraq and its aftermath are further testimony to that. What is unfortunate is that the invasion by the United States without United Nations endorsement, and the Bush administration’s primacy policy and juvenile strong kid on the block “coalition of the willing” idea has drastically weakened the global cohesion for collective action.

There is a need for the reinforcement and reasonable reform of the existing global institutions. Whether we like it or not, the global power structure is becoming multipolar again. The United Nations will not and cannot become an instrument of United States foreign policy as some would like it to be. If it did, we will have to create another global institution. The fact is that we already have a plethora of global and regional institutions in many domains with different levels and kinds of membership (NGOs, corporations, regional powers and governments) which are not coordinated and at times pull in different directions, weakening the global community’s impact. Many more people have died and have been displaced in Sudan in the past years than were in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Yet, because of the incongruence of the functional interests and cultural values of different actors, thousands more are being displaced, robbed, raped and killed as the African Union troops are ham-strung and NATO and the United Nations shuffle.

Besides the observation of the notional principles of respect for human rights, globalization and flow of information have made transparency a requirement for the good standing of actors in the global arena. With technological advances in the means of detection, and the proliferation of observation agencies (NGOs etc.) it has become nearly impossible for the actors to hide the degree of their non-compliance with the notional principles of global good behavior. They may not comply, but they can hardly hide it. 

Desirable Courses

Rather than exporting democracy to non-Western cultures as a process for legitimization of power into authority, the West would be better off by exporting the conditions which, in its own evolution, contributed to the emergence of democracy. Above all, this could be advanced by contributing to the increase in the secular content of education from an early age, leading to the understanding of the rudiments of civil society.[38]

Global development programs of governments, NGOs, foundations and private donors should be oriented more towards education. An educated population can take better care of its health, while an ignorant healthy population can become prey to fundamentalism. International programs to improve the world population’s health create better work forces and lay grounds for fighting poverty. But they do not build defenses in the minds of men against superstition and bigotry unless combined with rational educational programs.

In the long run, instead of imposing democracy and nation-building on incongruent entities, the global community will become more efficient if, as occasions arise, political identities and structures are rearranged along more meaningful bases. I am referring to the concept of estans and their overarching institutions which I presented to this Committee in 2002.[39] Had my concept of estans been applied earlier on in the reorganization of Iraq, we would have had three to five autonomous estans – including an international zone as the city-state of Baghdad – all overarched by such institutions as a federal consultative council, a common oil corporation with all estans as shareholders receiving the benefits of the oil resources, a common water management system covering navigation, irrigation and the supply of water to all estans, inter-estan transportation networks, etc. 

Finally, I would like to underscore here my earlier reference to consumerism as an ideology. It is presently the driving force of global economy. “Consumerism globalization” stands in contradistinction to “developmental globalization.” Consumerism globalization is in effect an aberration of capitalism’s basic principles of offer and demand, and competition and marketing. Following consumerism ideology, capital does not seek development opportunities which could increase material wealth and reduce global economic imbalance, but seeks to create demand where the purchasing power already exists. The creation of new purchasing power becomes incidental to it – that of the pay of workers producing consumer goods. It does not help create ramparts against the spread of ignorance and violence by religious fundamentalism by alleviating poverty, but rather exacerbates inequalities.

As producers of “consumer goods” collude and compete, they pit workers world wide against each other to compete for lower wages. The reduction of the purchasing power of the working classes in the developed countries and yet, following consumerism logic, titillation of their appetite to consume more, lower the quality of the goods offered to the masses. Meanwhile, the affluent classes, produced and nurtured by consumerism, are catered to with ever more luxurious goods– not necessarily useful by a long shot (diamond studded hubcaps!)[40] Consumerism is not a sustainable ideology, but it can do a lot of damage before it is overtaken by some other value system. Let us hope that what follows is developmental globalization and not a totalitarian ideology or faith.

“Developmental globalization” would move the orientation of global capital investment towards sectors which contribute to raising the standards of living worldwide. Instead of spreading casino chains around the world, capital could be used to build railroads, toll ways, power plants, hospitals and schools. For profit, of course!

There will, per force, be gray areas where enterprise would be initiated for exploitation and consumerism, yet contribute, as a side effect, to some development – such as a railroad between a foreign mining concession site and a port, a toll way for tourism or development of communication networks to market cellphones. It will be the overall effect of the enterprise and the vision of those engaged in it which, in the long run, will either contribute to broader well being of those it touches or create sources of conflict.

While not necessarily engaged in meeting the goal of “democracy’s public service responsibilities,” discussed earlier, developmental globalism would prepare the grounds for greater popular awareness. Creating basic infrastructures would help alleviate poverty and enlarge middle classes – more resilient to fundamentalist extremism – around the world. Introducing scientific approaches in education for the understanding of natural and physical phenomena – needed for creating efficient and knowledgeable work forces – would plant seeds in the minds of men to debate and doubt fundamentalist dogma and superstition. Including secular and civic values in education would develop sensible social organization and predictable and reasonable discipline, whether in the work place, or among the managers, the entrepreneurs and the members of the society at large. 

International organizations, whether intergovernmental such as the World Bank or NGOs have a stake in this and should become more focused in promoting such orientations. Like corporate social responsibility which gained global recognition and is more and more observed by multinational corporations, the global political responsibilities of global finance should now be addressed.

Global finance should be prodded and convinced that while in the short term the rate of return on the capital may be lower, in the long run, developmental globalization will create a much bigger global market, a more peaceful and secure environment for investment – and maybe, better conditions for the spread of democracy.

©2006 Anoush Khoshkish

Akim, Inc.New York

[1] This report addresses the general theme of the International Political Science Association’s 20th World Congress, which was: “Is Democracy Working?”The Congress met in Fukuoka, Japan in July 2006.This report was prepared for the Research Committee on Political Power (R.C. 36). 
[2] Greek Pnuks , pronounced "Pnuks" in ancient Greek or "Pniks" in Modern Greek. For a review of earlier democracies see, for example,Ernest Barker. Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors, London, 4th Ed., 1951; and J. A. O. Larsen, Representative Government in Greek and Roman History, Berkeley California University Press, 1955.
[3] Popper, Karl R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945.Notably ch. 11, sec. 2, and therein the footnote referring to Antisthenes saying: “I can see a horse, Plato, but I cannot see its horseness.”For samples of mid-twentieth century approaches to the understanding of democracy see Richard McKeon (ed.), Democracy in a World of Tensions: A Symposium Prepared by UNESCO, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951. 
[4] For a more detailed treatment of the topic and references see A. Khoshkish, The Socio-political Complex: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Political Life, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1979, Ch. 11. Also at
[5] It claimed that “the arduous and urgent affairs concerning the king, state and defense of the realm were proper subjects and matter of council and debate in parliament.”Which prompted James I to tear the page containing the protestation out of the Journal of the Commons and dissolve the parliament.
[6] It declared that “king James had subverted the constitution of the kingdom and broken the original contract between king and people.”In its Declaration of Rights it referred to the “true, ancient, and indubitable rights of the people.”
[7] For the treatment of democratic theory see, notably, George Sabine, A History of Political Theory, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961 (1937).See Madison’s distinction between democracy and republic in The Federalists, No.10.Also in A. Khoshkish, The Socio-political Complex, op.cit., ch. 14.
[8] For example, many of the English people would still literally uphold their monarch’s claim to “Dieu et mon Droit”; and the French Republic has kept some of the regal and aristocratic shades of its past.More striking, in the United States, the mother of modern democracies,some, and among them not the least, such as Supreme Court Judge Antonin Scalia, believe that the democratic process is an instrument fulfilling the will of God.See Antonin Scalia, “God’s Justice and Ours”, in First Things, 123, May 2002, pp.17-21, notably pp 6-8.
[9 ] (3,929,782 according to 1790 census) Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy, Boston, Atlantic-Little Brown, 1955, p.32.
[10] For a good historic description of the evolution and dynamics of the power pyramids in the United States in 18th and 19th centuries seeSean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln,New York, Norton, 2005 
[11] The literature on elitism is extensive.See, for example, Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London,George Allen & Unwin, 1954, 1942, part IV; C. Wright Mills, The Power of Elite, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956. (For a Critique of Mills see Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, New York, 1960.)Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961;Michael Parenti,Democracy for the Few, 4th ed., New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1983;Jeff Faux, The Global Class War, Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley & Sons, 2006. 
[12]   R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, Ch.II, § III.
[13] On evolutions in the U. K. along the lines argued here see:David Marquand, Decline of the Public: The Hollowing Out of Citizenship, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004;and Anthony Sampson, Who Runs This Place? The Anatomy of Britain in the 21st Century, London. John Murray, 2004.
[14] For an earlier analysis see David Riesman et al., The Lonely Crowd: A Study of Changing American Character, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950.Notably ch.X, “Images of Power.”
[15] Just as an illustration, we can evoke the recent shifts of weight away from the trade unions in the United States and United Kingdom and their still relative strong position in France. 
[16] For a caustic review of contemporary conservative assessment see James Bovard, Attention Deficit Democracy, New York, Palgrave, 2006.
[17 ] William H. Riker, Democracy in the United States, New York, Macmillan, 1953, p.21
[18] Robert A., Dahl, On Democracy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998, p. 17 et seq.and– (ed.) Political Opposition in Western Democracies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966.
[19] John Dewey, Democracy and Education, New York, Macmillan, 1916; “Democracy and Educational Administration” in School and Society, April 3, 1937, where Dewey describes the foundation of democracy as faith in the capacity of human nature, intelligence and the power of pooled and cooperative experience; and the aim of democratic education as the realization of the kingdom of God on earth. See also Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character since the 1880's, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950.For a critical discussion of the topic see Patrick Deneen, Democratic Faith, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005.
[20] On “personal choice” as a criterion see Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution: Authority in a Good Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970.
[21] As John Stuart Mill put it, “There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with the individual independence”, On Liberty, Chs 1 & 4.
[22]   For a recent inventory, see Robert O'Harrow Jr., No Place to Hide, New York, Free Press, 2004.
[23] See “Is Freedom Just Another Word for Many Things to Buy?” by Barry Schwartz, Hazel Rose Markus and Alana Conner Snibbe,New York Times, 26 February, 2006.
[24] See, for example, - New York Times, 20 December, 2005,“F.B.I. Watched Activist Groups, New Files Show,” by Eric Lichtblau; - Financial Times, 27 January, 2006, “Crime watch,” by Sarah Duguid; - Wall Street Journal, 27 April 2006, “Neighborhood Watch, Pentagon Steps Up Intelligence Efforts Inside U.S. Borders: Post-9/11 Campaign Includes Tracking Antiwar Protests, Mining Large Databases 'Collecting' vs. 'Receiving',” by Robert Block and Jay Solomon;- New York Times, March 31, 2006,“At Sept.11 Trial, Tale of Missteps and Management,” by Scott Shane.
[25] My secret hope in advancing doomsday predictions is, of course, that it won’t happen!As I have repeatedly noted, the peculiarity of prediction in social sciences – as distinct from exact sciences – is that once a prediction is made, its chances of actually happening are drastically reduced.Because it alerts those disadvantaged by it and they will see to it that it does not come true.Marx’s prediction of proletarian revolution made bourgeois capitalism devise safety valves of social security and other entitlements, and instigate labor to turn itself into a commodity and have trade unions bargain for its price.
[26] One of our handicaps in propagating democracy globally is our own hang-up on religion – see Kevin Phillips, American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century, New York, Viking/Penguin, 2006.
[27] On United States claim to being the standard bearer see Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath, How America Acts as the World’s Government in the Twenty-first Century, New York, Public Affairs, 2005.
[28] I have in mind the case of T’ai P’ing rebellion in China (1850-1864) whose leader Huang Hsiu Ch’iun was inspired by Protestant thoughts.
[29] Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence, New York, Random House, 1961
[30] The British “indirect rule” conferred power to many Moslem emirates because they were better structured than others.The last massive manu militariconversion of heathens into Islam was carried out in Kafiristan In 1895 by Amir Abdul Rahman of Afghanistanwhose expedition was partly financed by the British – his British annual subsidy was increased from 12,000 to 16,000 lakhs of rupees (to cover the expedition.)The partition of India – inspired by the British dictum of "divide and rule" – resulted in the formation of the first "Islamic Republic," that of Pakistan.Roosevelt’s pledge of protection to Ibn Saud in 1945 legitimized the hold of Wahabism in Saudi Arabia.The support given to the Mujahedin in Afghanistan in their fight against Soviet occupation eventually led to the emergence of the Taliban. etc.
[32] See John Fry, The Helsinki Process: Negotiating Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D. C., National Defense University Press, 1993, p.116 et seq.
[33] For an argument (including recipe) in favor of America’s role in spreading democracy around the world see Graham T. Allison, Jr.& Robert P. Beschel, Jr. “Can the United States Promote Democracy?” in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No.1 (Spring 1992) pp. 81-98.On the evolution of academic thought on prospects of implanting different modes of democratic practices in non-Western cultures see, for example,David Held, (ed.) Prospects for Democracy, North, South, East West, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993,and - Models of Democracy, Stanford, Standard University Press, 2nd ed. 1996, - Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative, Cambridge, Polity, 2004.
[34] In 1995 the Defense Export Loan Guarantee Act permitted the Pentagon to administer loan programs to less prosperous countries thus extending the recycling process also to bilateral aids and grants.For more recent reports on the U. S. arms trade see:
[35] For checks and balances for accountability of global actors see Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics” in American Political Science Review, Vol.99, No.1, February 2005, pp.29-43. See also my “Factors Approach to Global Human Dynamics” at
[37]   See “Factors Approach to Global Human Dynamics,” op.cit.
[38]   See my argument for civil society at